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ABSTRACT
The study explores the extent to which the U.N. Secretary-General can uphold his or her
own views when confronted with adverse stances from powerful States. More
specifically, it analyzes a particular modus operandi originally developed by Dag
Hammarskjold, known as the “Peking formula”. This form of good offices is discussed in
two contexts, namely the 1954-1955 Sino-American hostage crisis when it was first used
and the more recent attempts of Javier Perez de Cuéllar and Kofi Annan at solving the
subsequent Iraq crises. Drawing upon these two case-studies, the author offers a
theoretical account of the complex interactions between law and politics underlying the
good offices role of the U.N. Secretary-General.

“When a diplomat says `yes', he means `perhaps'; when he says `perhaps' he means `no';
and when he says `no', he is no diplomat. When a lady says `no', she means `perhaps';
when she says `perhaps', she means `yes'; and when she says `yes', she is no lady”
(Voltaire)

INTRODUCTION
Voltaire’s politically incorrect plaisantrie insolently depicts one of the most
prominent skills usually attributed to diplomats. In the say of some less eloquent
writers, a diplomat is someone who can tell you to go to hell in a way you are
actually looking forward to it. Or still, a diplomat may never speak bluntly, even
when things are blunt.
Aside of the oversimplification such a description purports, there is at least
one diplomat who, as it has been recently claimed, cannot say no, namely the
U.N. Secretary-General. This issue was indeed vividly discussed in a recent
*
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symposium on the role of the U.N. Secretary General1. Many of the distinguished
attendees seemed quite skeptical at the possibility that the Secretary-General
oppose his or her views to those of powerful States, even when acting in perfect
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV of the U.N. Charter. Everyone
recognized, for sure, that the Secretary-General’s independence is of paramount
importance for the office to be a relevant force in world affairs. Most States
benefit from the Secretary-General’s developing role as a good officer, that is as a
useful resource to solve some of the most delicate political crises2. Even countries
reluctant to let the Secretary-General lead an active political role have at some
point praised the incumbent’s efforts in solving intricate crises. But such a role
cannot operate, let alone flourish, unless the Secretary-General is both
independent and perceived as independent.
This situation leads to something close to a dilemma, and one that seems
inherent to the Office of the Secretary-General3. Within the current debate on the
reform of the U.N. and with the succession of Kofi Annan approaching, it seems
appropriate to reflect on how future incumbents may deal with this dilemma. The
answers given to this question will indeed strongly influence the performance of
the U.N. in achieving its primary goal, namely the maintenance of international
peace and security. In this piece, we focus on one possible answer to the dilemma
identified, an answer grown out of practice during a period of the U.N. that, albeit
different in many respects, resembles the present international context in that
many of the challenges ahead may arise between parties that hardly speak to each
other4. This answer, commonly referred to as the “Peking formula”, was
1
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developed by Dag Hammarskjold during the Sino-American hostage crisis in
1954-1955. We argue that the middle ground between a yes and a no available to
the U.N. Secretary-General when exercising his/her good offices can be
conceptualized using the Peking formula as its template form. In this regard, we
compare the original instance where this modus operandi emerged with a recent
case, namely the Secretary-General’s efforts to prevent the Iraq crises. These two
cases provide the raw materials for analyzing the extent to which the SecretaryGeneral can say no, legally and politically, when acting as a good officer.
The study is structured into three sections. The first discusses briefly the
chief provisions of the U.N. charter dealing with the office of the SecretaryGeneral. Particular emphasis is drawn here to articles 98 and 99, which are
considered as the core legal basis for the Secretary-General’s political role. The
second section deals tour à tour with the Sino-American and Iraq crises. Finally,
the third section discusses specific ways in which law and politics interact in the
exercise of the Secretary-General’s good offices role. Overall, this piece is not to
be considered as an analysis of current events, but rather as an attempt to put the
role of the U.N. Secretary-General in historical and theoretical perspective.

I. THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
A. The provisions of the Charter
The UN Secretariat as a whole was given a stronger position within the
Organization than the one held by the League’s Secretariat5. Indeed, Article 7 of
the UN Charter states that: “1. There are established as the principal organs of the
United Nations : a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and
Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a
Secretariat”. This provision puts the Secretariat on an equal institutional footing
with respect to the other organs. Apart from Article 7, many other provisions refer
to the Secretary-General and his staff6. Among these, the most important are those
included in Chapter XV of the Charter, namely articles 97, 98, 99, 100 and 101.
Here, we will give a brief general outline of these articles serving as a basis for
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the more detailed analysis of articles 98 and 99 undertaken in the following subsection.
According to Article 97: “The Secretariat shall comprise a SecretaryGeneral and such staff as the Organization may require”. Although this
formulation follows quite closely that of article 6.1 of the League’s Covenant7, it
does not mention the “secretaries” or deputies that were the object of long debates
at San Francisco. Article 97 continues: “The Secretary-General shall be appointed
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”.
Again, this part of the article was also very much debated and its adoption
followed the renunciation by the Great Powers to include deputy SecretariesGeneral8. The last phrase of Article 97 runs: “He (the Secretary-General) shall be
the chief administrative officer of the Organization”. Although this formulation
could lead us to think that the office of the Secretary-General is eminently
administrative, such interpretation is not entirely consistent with Article 7 of the
Charter, which, as pointed out, considers the Secretariat as a principal organ.
Articles 98 and 99 have been used as the core legal basis of the UN
Secretary-General’s political action. The analysis of these two articles will be the
matter of the following sub-section. However, in order to have a complete picture
of the functions of the Secretariat, it can be useful to anticipate here the main
possibilities given by these articles to the Secretary-General without going into
detail. Article 98 mentions three executive functions: the Secretary-General shall
act in that capacity in all meetings of the Assembly or the Councils; he shall
perform other functions entrusted to him by these bodies ; and he shall make an
annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization. Article 99
mentions a crucial right of the Secretary-General that paradoxically has almost
never been explicitly used, namely the right to bring to the attention of the
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security.
As to Articles 100 and 101, they provide for an international civil service
appointed by the Secretary-General according to regulations established by the
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General Assembly. The importance of these two provisions resides in that they
seek to ensure an impartial Secretariat, operating free from illegal State pressure.

B. Articles 98 and 99 as the primary legal basis for political action9
According to former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuéllar: “Anyone who
has the honor to be cast Secretary General has to avoid two extremes in playing
his, or her, role. On one side is the Scylla of trying to inflate the role through too
liberal a reading of the text: of succumbing, that is, to vanity and wishful thinking.
On the other is the Charybdis of trying to limit the role to only those
responsibilities which are explicitly conferred by the Charter and are impossible
to escape: that is, succumbing to modesty, to the instinct of self-effacement, and
to the desire to avoid controversy. There are, thus, temptations on both sides. Both
are equally damaging to the vitality of the institution. I submit that no SecretaryGeneral should give way to either of them”10.
Though primarily a metaphorical political remark, these words of a former
holder of the Office show strikingly well the difficulties that are found when
trying to understand the limits set by the Charter to the political action of the
Secretary-General. The mythological monsters Scylla and Charybdis were in fact
dangerous streams affecting navigation through the strait of Messina in Southern
Italy. Comparing these streams to the forces governing international affairs, we
could continue Perez de Cuéllar’s allegory saying that even if a Secretary-General
is a good enough navigator to sail across these streams, his or her direction will be
undoubtedly affected by their force. Whether a Secretary-General tends to enlarge
his role or, on the contrary to minimize it, will heavily depend on world affairs at
that time. However, the wording of the Charter as to the political powers and
competences of the Secretary-General cannot easily change. One element seems
thus to be missing. How can a fixed wording adapt to such changes in
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international affairs? The obvious legal answer is by interpreting the relevant
provisions of the U.N. Charter in the light of their object and purpose11.
Articles 98 and 99 refer to several executive functions and powers of the
Secretary-General. The political influence of these functions and powers varies
considerably according to different factors such as the state of world affairs, the
personality of the Secretary-General, the interpretation of the article prevailing at
the time, and others. As already noted, Article 98 distinguishes three functions :
the Secretary General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Assembly or
the Councils ; he shall perform other functions entrusted to him by these bodies ;
and he shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the
Organization.
Concerning the first function, the text is not clear when it refers to acting
“in that capacity”. If we look at the last phrase of Article 97 we would tend to
think that this expression points to the status of “Chief Administrative Officer” of
the Organization. However, if we consider this “capacity” in the light of Articles 7
and 99 and we further take into account the travaux préparatoires, the
administrative character becomes less salient. Such interpretation is further
suggested by the regulations of the main deliberative bodies, which give a right of
intervention and of proposition to the Secretary-General12. Furthermore, the
Secretary-General has the right to propose points for the Agenda of the different
bodies13. Thus, not only does the combination of Article 98 and internal
regulations represent the enlargement of Article 99 to other deliberative bodies,
11
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12
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but it also allows the Secretary-General to intervene within the Security Council
without invoking the highly politicized Article 99. In practice, every SecretaryGeneral has used the right of speech especially before the Security Council. The
exercise of such right before the General Assembly has been less recurrent
because of its unpredictable results14.
The second function is more difficult to circumscribe. In fact, it would be
better to refer to as a group of functions. If on the one hand this difficulty involves
a considerable degree of uncertainty, the open formulation of the phrase has, on
the other hand, been essential to the development of the Secretary-General’s
political role. During the first years of the Organization, the resolutions of the
General Assembly and the Security Council usually confined the SecretaryGeneral to mostly administrative tasks. This does not mean that the SecretaryGeneral himself interpreted his responsibilities as merely administrative. On the
contrary, he has always tended to act as a neutral mediator among States and
between States and international organs. Moreover, the scope of the tasks
entrusted to him has changed over time, taking the form of extremely large and
imprecise mandates issued by the General Assembly or the Councils. The
bargaining inherent to any compromise has led in many cases to the adoption of
vague and even apparently contradictory texts requiring the Secretary-General “to
take action” without any further detail as to the nature of the action, and this even
in extremely urgent situations. The large room for maneuver left to the SecretaryGeneral by such mandates carries, by the same token, a great deal of
responsibility in matters of international peace and security15. This has positive
and negative aspects. It is for instance highly desirable that the direction of
peacekeeping operations, where it is often indispensable to make quick decisions,
be entrusted to an executive body such as the Secretary-General. However, such
delegation has sometimes been used by States to get rid of their primary
responsibility by sending it downstream. As Javier Perez de Cuéllar observes: “…
it would gravely harm the interests of peace if the Secretary-General were ever to
become a façade, behind which there was only deadlock and disagreement. He
must not become an alibi for inaction”16. Furthermore, using Perez de Cuéllar’s
14
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symbolism again, it is only when such extremely vague mandates are formulated
that the attitude of the Secretary-General towards Scylla and Charybdis entails a
political risk17. It is true that after the 1967 crisis, mandates concerning the
deployment of peacekeeping operations tended to be more precise. However,
vague mandates are far from having disappeared. In practice, they have become
quite common in the field of dispute settlement where the UN Secretary-General,
as an impartial force in international affairs, can play a major role.
The last phrase of article 98 runs as follows: “The Secretary-General shall
make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization”.
This report has been the object of different interpretations and evaluations.
Originally, the report on the work of the Organization, which is a rule inherited
from the League of Nations, was considered as an administrative attribution. That
was at least the spirit that guided the adoption of this provision. But the holders of
the Office of the Secretary-General have interpreted this function in a political
sense. While, admittedly, the very idea of such a report entails an interpretation of
the international state of affairs, which constitutes in itself a political act18, this
attribution has in practice been used as an interesting policy instrument in the
hands of the Secretary-General19. Moreover, this policy approach has spilled over
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The Congo crisis in 1960, and the 1967 retreat of UN troops from the Middle East. As
noted by Smouts, in both cases, the Secretary-General acted without having the political support of
a number of major States, which led to a very severe crisis of the United Nations system as a
whole.
18
As Michel Virally points out : “… alors même qu’il (le rapport) doit rester impartial et
objectif, il ne peut se contenter d’être une simple chronologie, ou encore une nomenclature d’actes
passés par les divers organes des Nations Unies. Il se doit d’essayer de relier entre eux les
événements de l’année et les réactions qu’ils ont provoquées de la part de l’Organisation, les
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lumière les conséquences incluses dans les uns et les autres. En d’autres termes, il ne saurait
manquer d’être une interprétation de la conjoncture internationale et du rôle qu’y ont joué les
Nations Unies en tant que telles, un bilan qui se prolonge nécessairement par des perspectives
d’avenir”, Le rôle politique du Secrétaire general des Nations Unies in Annuaire français de droit
international, 1958, pp. 365-366.
19
In this development, it is possible to distinguish four moments. At the beginning,
Secretary-General Trygvie Lie adopted the same format as that used at the times of the League,
namely a short introduction of 3 or 4 pages written by him followed by the report itself, written by
the Secretariat services, which described in great detail the work of the Organization. The tone of
the report changed when Dag Hammarskjöld took office. The document was then divided into two
parts presented separately: on the one hand, a substantial introduction of analytical nature written
by the Secretary-General, including suggestions for further action; on the other hand, the report
itself which was nothing but a descriptive summary constituting a mere supplement to the
introduction. In 1977, at the 32nd session of the General Assembly, the report itself was reduced to
a short chronology of dates and facts, before disappearing at the 33rd session. Thus, the report
referred to in article 98 was considered to be only the Secretary-General’s introduction, in which
he gave his point of view on the functioning of the Organization. This evolution was not
resisted by States. On the contrary, it was explicitly acknowledged by the General Assembly in
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to other reports of the Secretary-General as well, such as illustrated by Kofi
Annan’s Millennium Report setting an Agenda for the 21st Century20. Thus, the
political character of the Secretary-General’s reports is now openly accepted,
which does not necessary mean that, in practice, its conclusions are followed by
Member States.
With regard to Article 99 of the Charter, it has been considered as the
fundamental basis of the Secretary-General’s political role. Paradoxically, it has
almost never been explicitly used. The interest of vesting in the Secretary-General
a right “to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” was
originally intended to avoid that national considerations prevent a matter from
being considered by the Security Council because of the absence of an initiative
stemming from Member States21. More precisely, the authority given by Article
99 to the UN Secretary-General can be interpreted as including three main
elements22, namely right, responsibility and discretion. The first element was clear
since the San Francisco Conference and has never been contested. The other two
elements are closely interrelated since discretion must be backed up by
responsibility. Whether the Secretary-General uses his right or not, is a matter
falling within his discretion. But wherever there is an alternative, there is also the
responsibility to choose one of the options offered. According to Perez de Cuéllar:
“Before invoking the Article, the Secretary-General has to consider carefully how
his initiative will fare, given the agreement or lack thereof among the Permanent
Members and also the positions of the Non-permanent Members. A situation may
in certain cases be aggravated and not eased if the Secretary-General draws
attention, under Article 99, and the Security Council then does nothing”23. The
invocation of this article would represent for the Secretary-General something
similar to a Prime Minister asking a vote of confidence in a parliamentary regime,
since what is at stake is the trust placed on him by the deliberative organ24. Such
1982, when Javier Perez de Cuéllar presented his first report. See SMOUTS, M.-C., op. cit., pp.
1324-1325.
20
We the Peoples. The Role of the U.N. in the 21st Century (3 April 2000).
21
We should recall here that Article 11 paragraph 1 of the League’s Covenant stated : “Any
war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is
hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that
may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency
should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith
summon a meeting of the Council” (italics added).
22
PEREZ DE CUELLAR, J., op. cit., p. 129.
23
Ibid., p. 130.
24
“… en invoquant l’article 99, le Secrétaire général décide que telle affaire intéresse la
sécurité internationale et qu’elle est susceptible d’être portée devant l’Organisation. Par là même il
préjuge de la réponse favorable du Conseil de sécurité. L’initiative est lourde de conséquences car
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difficulties have made the explicit invocation of Article 99 extremely rare25
fostering, by the same token, the development of a parallel practice based on the
“spirit” of this provision. Indeed, the spirit of Article 99 has been largely invoked
and used to assert the political role of the Secretary-General, especially after Dag
Hammarskjöld took office. It was him who developed a refined theory as to the
role of the Organization and of his Secretary-General26, focusing on the notion of
discrete and preventive diplomacy of this latter. This doctrine has been followed
by his successors to the Office and is essential to understand the legal foundation
of the political role of the Secretary-General.
Indeed, in many respects, the shadow of Hammarskjold still appears to
haunt the 38th floor of the U.N. Plaza. Speaking at the aforesaid recent Conference
on the U.N. Secretary-General, Sir Brian Urquhart, a former top U.N. official who
has worked for the organization since its inception, submitted that
Harmmarskjold’s legacy should serve as a benchmark for choosing the next
Secretary-General27. As we will see next, the part of this legacy embodied in the
“Peking formula” well represents what Thomas Franck suggested in his recent
intervention. The Secretary-General can by no means become partisan. This is
true even when he/she may face open opposition from a powerful State. How, in
this context, is it possible to address what may well be perhaps the most daunting
challenge inherent to the office of the Secretary-General?

II. SQUARING THE CIRCLE: THE “PEKING FORMULA”28
on peut très bien imaginer un Secrétaire général surestimant le poids de son influence auprès du
Conseil et portant sur le bureau de celui-ci une affaire dont un des membres permanents refuse de
connaître”, SMOUTS, M.-C. Commentaire ad art. 99 in COT, J.-P., PELLET, A., (eds.), La
Charte des Nations Unies, 2nd edn., Economica, Paris, 1991, p. 1329.
25
To our knowledge, Article 99 has so far been explicitly invoked only in three cases : in
the Congo crisis of 1960, in the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979 and in the
1989 Lebanon crisis. In other occasions the Secretary-General has brought a matter to the attention
of the Security Council without explicitly invoking Article 99. It is sometimes difficult to
determine whether Article 99 has been actually invoked or not. In this respect, see for example the
Korean crisis of 1950 where, although Trygve Lie presupposed that he had overtly invoked article
99, the Security Council became active rather as a result of a previous initiative of the US.
26
This doctrine can be found in his Introductions to the Annual Report and in his speeches.
See FOOTE, W. (ed.), The Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag
Hammarskjold, Bodly Head, London, 1962.
27
On Hammarskjold legacy see, among others: URQUHART, B., Hammarskjold, Alfred A.
Knopf, New York, 1972; VIRALLY, M., Le testament politique du Secrétaire général des Nations
Unies in Annuaire français de droit international, 1961, pp. 355-380.
28
This section draws upon and expands the discussion provided in VINUALES, J.E., The
U.N. Secretary-General between Law and Politics: Towards an Analytical Framework for
Interdisciplinary Research, Graduate Institute of International Studies (collection Etudes et
travaux), Geneva, 2005.
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A. The original context
Apart from some rather moderate initiatives by Trygve Lie to assert an
independent role in solving political crises, such as his intervention before the
Security Council regarding the alleged communist infiltration in Greece’s
northern frontiers or his initiatives in the Berlin crisis and the Korean war29, it was
Dag Hammarskjold who actually made the decisive steps in this direction.
The diplomatic technique that came to be known as the “Peking formula”
was first developed by Hammarskjold as a way to solve the 1954-55 SinoAmerican crisis. Considering that the mandate entrusted to him by the General
Assembly was too judgmental to serve as the basis for political solution to the
crisis, Hammarskjold claimed to be acting in his own authority when asking the
government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the release of several
American prisoners. General Assembly Resolution 906 (1954), condemned indeed
: “as contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the trial and conviction of
prisoners of war illegally detained after 25 September 1953” before requesting the
Secretary-General: “… in the name of the United Nations, to seek the release, in
accordance with the Korean Armistice Agreement, of these eleven United Nations
Command personnel, and all other captured personnel of the United Nations
Command still detained” and “… to make, by the means most appropriate in his
judgement, continuing and unremitting efforts to this end”30. The Chinese foreign
affairs minister, Chou En-lai, had strongly reacted against this resolution,
declaring that: “no amount of clamor on the part of the United States can shake
China’s just stand of exercising its own sovereign right in convicting the United
States spies”31. Hammarskjold was perceptive enough to understand that any
solution to the crisis would require a face-saving exit for the Chinese communist
government. Although nothing in the U.N. Charter explicitly vested in the
Secretary-General the authority to dissociate himself from a mandate entrusted to
him, claiming an independent say in matters of international peace and security,
29

In the Greek affair, in September 1946, Trygve Lie claimed an independent power of
investigation separate from that of the Council: “I hope the Council will understand that the
Secretary-General must reserve his rights to make such enquiries or investigations as he may think
necessary, in order to determine whether or not he should consider bringing any aspect of this
matter up to the attention of the Council under the provisions of the Charter”, Security Council
Official Records, 70th meeting, 20 September 1946, p. 404, cited in FRANCK, Th., NOLTE, G.,
op. cit., p. 144. It is interesting to mention that the Secretary-General’s claim was encouraged by
the representative of the Soviet Union, in part perhaps because of Lie’s leftist background.
30
Cf. General Assembly Official Records, 509th plenary meeting, 10th December 1954.
31
UN Doc. A/2889 cited in URQUHART, B., Hammarskjold, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1972, pp. 102-103.
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Hammarskjold took a gamble based on his perception of the political room for
maneuver left to him both by the PRC and especially by the US attitude.
Putting aside a General Assembly mandate was quite an overstretch from the
legal point of view, something of which Hammarskjold was very much aware32.
From a political perspective, however, the Secretary-General intended to carefully
prepare the ground. For instance, aware that the US would require, for reasons
related to its domestic politics, a resolution making it clear that the PRC was in
fault, he proceeded to a first test of the American bottom line by informing Cabot
Lodge, on December 8th, of the way he understood the mandate the Assembly was
likely to give him. Brian Urquhart notes that: “He did this in order to give the
United States the chance to back down if it wanted to”33. He then made
arrangements for having some Western European delegations introduce a phrase
into the final wording of the resolution granting him some discretion to deal with
the situation. In order to legitimize his action before both the UN organs and Chou
En-lai, Hammarskjold emphasized that the phrase “by the means most appropriate
in his (Secretary-General’s) judgement” included in the final resolution applied to
his mission in general34.
Then, in his first meeting with the Chinese official, Hammarskjold took
great pains to clarify his legal (and thus political) authority. The account given by
Brian Urquhart of how Hammarskjold handled this delicate position is instructive
in this respect: “(Hammarskjold) explained that in fulfilling his obligation to try to
reduce international tensions anywhere in the world, the Secretary-General did not
work for any one nation or even for a majority of nations as expressed in a vote in
the General Assembly but under his constitutional responsibility for the general
purposes set out in the Charter, which were applicable to members and nonmembers of the United Nations alike. It was on this basis that he had come to
Peking. The General Assembly resolution had brought to the fore a case where
Hammarskjold had both the right and the duty to act as Secretary-General, but the
Charter of the United Nations, not the condemnation of the General Assembly in
its resolution of December 10, formed the legal basis for his present visit”35.

32

Replying to a letter of Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. asking him to get personally involved,
Hammarskjold had indeed acknowledged that if he was requested by the Assembly to undertake a
negotiation under Article 98 of the Charter he “clearly could not refuse”, Ibid., p. 99.
33
Ibid., p. 100.
34
Ibid., p. 101.
35
Ibid., p. 105. Interestingly enough, this conception of the U.N. as the embodiment of
international legality has more recently been used by the Swiss authorities to become part of the
U.N. without renouncing to its neutrality. However, if this may be case now that the U.N. includes
almost all the sovereign states of the world, back in the 1950s only some 50 countries were
actually members of the organization. Moreover, the organization was still strongly perceived as

12

The results of this first visit to Peking were however ambiguous. Beyond
any concrete agreement, perhaps the most important outcome of this initiative was
to get Hammarskjold and Chou En-lai to know each other as well as to establish a
sort of mutual respect. As we shall see next, this implicit understanding was a
critical aspect in the way the crisis unfolded in the following months. It was also
during this period that the American administration came to realize that a facesaving strategy was the most plausible alternative to military intervention.
Hammarskjold’s name has often been associated with the idea of “quiet
diplomacy”, which share many features with diplomacy in its old secret vintage.
Reducing the public pressure to the minimum, while increasing the private
pressure to the maximum, that was the way to proceed. Moreover, the very
“quietness” of Hammarskjold’s initiative would also serve to play down any
criticism on the way the provisions of the U.N. Charter on the Secretary-General
were not only being interpreted but also directly applied.
This turned out to be a successful gamble. As soon as public pressure went
down, the face-saving dimension of Hammarskjold’s initiative yielded its
expected results, as suggested by the wording of the confidential cable sent by
Cho En-lai to Hammarskjold, through the Swedish Embassy in Switzerland, to
announce the release of ten more prisoners. The cable reads in its relevant part:
“… 2. The Chinese Government has decided to release the imprisoned U.S. fliers.
This release from serving their full term takes place in order to maintain
friendship with Hammaskjold and has no connection with the UN resolution.
Chou En-lai expresses the hope that Hammaskjold will take note of this point. 3.
The Chinese Government hopes to continue the contact established with
Hammarskjold. 4. Chou En-lai congratulates Hammarskjold on his 50th
birthday”36. It is quite curious the extent to which the cable is personalized. The
very concession sought by the Secretary-General appears as a symbolic gesture to
the person of Hammarskjold, thereby emphasizing the purported indifference of
the PRC regarding the U.N. and its member States37. The Secretary-General
considered it appropriate to keep the message confidential, probably because he
foresaw how valuable a relation with Chou En-lai could be in the future38. After

the creature of the victorious powers of World War II. This digression shows the extent of
Hammarskjold inventiveness and political skill.
36
Unpublished document, cited in URQUHART, B., op. cit., p. 126.
37
This “indifference” should not be carried too far. Indeed, it seems quite clear that at the
time, the PRC was strongly interested in becoming “the China” represented in the United Nations.
It is plausible that Chou En-lai may have been seeking to develop a close relationship with
Hammarskjold in the hope this would somewhat facilitate the PRC’s accession to the U.N. system.
38
In his September 9th report to the General Assembly on the mission, we find only a short
review of major facts, See UN Doc. A/2954, September 9th, 1954.
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all, the Peking mission had been a clear political success, and as such, no one
would seriously question the details of its legality. The Secretary-General thus
conquered an independent standing in political affairs39 that, only six years later
would cost Hammarskjold his own life40.
B. The new context
Among the conditions that made possible the development of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral throughout the decades of the office, one must not overlook the influence
of the Cold War on the functioning of the Security Council. To a given extent, it
was the failure of the Council that fostered the success of the Secretariat. Indeed,
the inability of the deadlocked Council to address urgent matters related to peace
and security provided the Secretary-General with enough leeway to assert his role
in world politics41.
With the end of the Cold War, the prospects of this role became more
uncertain, as did the prospects of the U.N. overall. As noted by Oscar Schachter in
the early 1990s in the context of the Gulf crisis: “The collective action taken
under the aegis of the United Nations has been hailed as a vindication of
international law and of the principle of collective security. At the same time, it
has also been perceived by many as still another example of the dominant role of
power and national self-interest in international relations. A plausible case can be
39

The first formal acknowledgement of this independent good offices role came later
following U Thant’s involvement in the Bahrain crisis. For the first time, the Security Council
acknowledged a good offices initiative that U Thant had undertaken, based on the spirit of Article
99, without previously consulting it. Despite some previous Soviet criticism, on May 11th 1970,
the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 278(1970) endorsing “the report of the
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General” and welcoming “the conclusions and findings
of the report”, Security Council Official Records, 1736th meeting, 11th May 1970. On the Bahrain
case see JENSEN, E., The Secretary-General’s use of good offices and the question of Bahrain in
Millennium, 14/3, 1985, pp. 335-348.
40
This assertion is only meant to suggest that Hammarskjold’s involvement in solving
security crises, as the one in Congo, put him at far higher risk. There is however some controversy
as to the specific circumstances that led to Hammarskjold’s death, a controversy we do not wish to
raise here.
41
A good illustration of this dynamics is provided by Hammarskjold’s decision to increase,
on his own authority, the UN Observer Group in Lebanon. Facing a deadlocked Security Council,
Hammarskjold declared to the members of the Council: “Where you to disapprove … I would of
course accept the consequences of your judgement”, Security Council Official Records, 837th mtg.,
22 July 1958, p. 4, cited in FRANCK, Th., NOLTE, G., op. cit., p. 145. This remark has a two-fold
interest. First, as Franck and Nolte note, the Secretary General asserts a competence of principle to
act in the interest of the world peace when the political organs are deadlocked. This competence,
although subject to disapproval of the organs, would then seem to be the rule whereas the
disapproval would be a sort of exception. Second, if the Security Council was deadlocked, how
could it suddenly take a decision disapproving the Secretary General’s action ? Such decision
would be at least quite unlikely. In the meantime, the Secretary General would find the political
space to act in the interest of world peace according to the principles of the Charter.
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made for each of these views”42. A few years later, Franck and Nolte welcomed
the: “… remarkable blossoming of the United Nations … reflected in the growth
of peacekeeping operations, and in the stream of mandatory resolutions from the
Security Council” adding that “the political role of the Secretary-General,
including the good offices function, also appeared to be expanding”43. Whereas
one may argue that the trend towards increased multilateralism has been left
behind, as suggested by the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the role of
the Secretary-General in helping solve international conflicts continues to be
perceived as perhaps the main attribute of the office. Moreover, even if we admit
that unilateralism has predominated, this trend may now be reversing as the EU,
China and Russia start to counterbalance American predominance. In all events,
what matters for our specific purpose is to understand how much leeway is
currently left to the Secretary-General to act as an independent force in
international peace and security.
Perhaps the best illustration of both the underlying dynamics of the
international system and the role of the U.N. Secretary-General in it is given by
the case of Iraq. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council
was in a very different position than the one it had undergone throughout the Cold
War44. Contrary to what Saddam may have originally expected, the new
environment allowed the Security Council to adopt Resolution 678 (1990),
authorizing Member States to use all necessary means to force Iraq back from its
position45. The wide participation in the military effort, which was heralded as the
rebirth of multilateralism, should not prevent us from seeing the underlying forces
driving the whole operation. Indeed, the United States and the United Kingdom
had tried to launch an armed intervention on the sole basis of the right of
collective self-defense, a right that Security Council Resolution 661(1990) had,
for the first time, explicitly recognized as applicable in a particular situation46. In
42

SCHACHTER, O., United Nations in the Gulf Conflict in American Journal of
International Law, 85/3, 1991, p. 452.
43
FRANCK, Th., NOLTE, G., op. cit., p. 143.
44
For an illuminating review of the Security Council’s practice see KIRGIS, F.L., The
Security Council’s First Fifty Years, in American Journal of International Law, 89/3, July 1995,
pp. 506-539.
45
The resolution was adopted by 12 votes to 2 (Cuba and Yemen) with one abstention
(China). For an interesting analysis of the basis of this resolution see WESTON, B.H., Security
Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, in American
Journal of International Law, 85/3, 1991, pp. 516-535.
46
SCHACHTER, O., op. cit., p. 457. Some authors challenged the consistence of this
position on the basis of the wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter, according to which the right
to self-defence exists only: “until the Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security”. In this regard, the adoption by Resolution 661 (1990) of
economic sanctions against Iraq would suspend the right to self-defence both individual and
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such circumstances, the two activist States had a powerful argument to undertake
military action on the request of Kuwait.
This is the context in which the then U.N. Secretary-General, Javier Perez de
Cuéllar, sought to intervene. His efforts in this crisis have been the object of
controversy. For some, the Secretary-General was too shy. He could and should
have played a more active role, instead of succumbing to what could be called,
using the very words of Perez de Cuéllar, the “Charybdis” of self-effacement.
Some five years later, Perez de Cuéllar recalled that, at the time, he had no doubt
that the United States would have acted unilaterally if necessary47. Could the
Secretary-General have gone against the interests of the two activist powers to any
given extent? The case is all the more relevant that the interests of two major
powers, including the current first military power in the world, were at issue. If it
could be established that some room for maneuver was left to the SecretaryGeneral, then one may conclude that Perez de Cuéllar could in fact have said a
sort of diplomatic ‘no’, pursuing to some extent what he thought the U.N. Charter
required. Broadly speaking, if one judges by the views expressed by most State
and U.N. officials at the aforementioned conference on the Secretary-General, the
conclusion would be that, as a rule, the Secretary-General can under no
circumstances oppose the explicit interests of major powers. In order to assess
whether this was the case in the Gulf crisis, let us go into some more detail as to
the circumstances of this particular conflict.
The Security Council referred for the first time to the Secretary-General’s
good offices role in the preamble of Resolution 664 of August 18th 1990:
collective Though the wording of the Charter is extremely clear, the Schachter’s argumentation
keeps a great deal of relevance if we take into account that the Security Council asserted the right
of collective-self defence in the preamble of Resolution 661 itself. In other words, if both terms,
namely collective self-defence and economic sanctions, were asserted simultaneously, one could
hardly consider them inconsistent with one another. Though persuasive, Schachter’s interpretation
is not the only plausible one. There is no assurance that the Security Council acts always in
conformity with the Charter, including Article 51. Although the issue is highly controversial, the
case of Lockerbie had already shown how the Council might serve the interests of particular
States, even in violation of the Charter principles. For three detailed studies on the
“constitutionality” of Security Council’s action see: GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, V., op. cit.;
ALVAREZ, J.E., Judging the Security Council in American Journal of International Law, 90/1,
1996, pp. 1-39; AKANDE, D., The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is
there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations, in
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 46/2, April 1997, pp. 309-343. In any case, the
ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions taken led, few weeks after, to the adoption of Resolution
678 (1990) authorizing Member States to use all necessary means to obtain the withdrawal of Iraqi
troops from Kuwait. For further details see WESTON, B.H., Security Council Resolution 678 and
Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, in American Journal of International Law, 85/3
, 1991, pp. 516-535.
47

PEREZ DE CUELLAR, J., Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future in
Global Governance, 1/2, 1995, p. 164.
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“Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations
with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the
members of the Council on 17 August 1990”48. Less than two weeks after this
resolution was passed, Perez de Cuéllar declared in a news conference in Bogotá
that: “the moment ha(d) arrived for the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
start diplomatic efforts aimed to solve in all its aspects the critical situation in the
gulf area”, adding that he had “invited … the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq,
Mr. Tariq Aziz, to urgently meet with (him) … in New York or Geneva, in order
to engage … in a full exchange of views on the crisis”49. He further noted that he
was acting on his own initiative, not at the behest of the Security Council, thus
trying to dissociate himself of the strong terms in which the Council had
condemned the annexation of Kuwait.
Perez de Cuéllar’s attempt to use the “Peking formula” intervened however
in a different environment than the one faced by Hammarskjold in 1955 or by
Hammarskjold’s successors in some other cases. The United States was the only
superpower and had adopted a tough stance. Brent Scowcroft, the American
National Security Adviser, had made it clear that the United States would not
“talk about anything” until a total and complete withdrawal of the Iraqi troops
from Kuwait took place50. And even if the United States had adopted a less rigid
stance, the circumstances of the Iraqi attack were so blatant a violation of the U.N.
Charter itself that the Secretary-General would have been unable to reach any
face-saving solution for Iraq without compromising the very principles of the
Charter. One should not be misled, in this respect, by the terms of the mandate
entrusted to the Secretary-General by paragraph 12 of Resolution 674 (1990)51,
which may be seen as a tactical move of the activist States to give the appearance
of having exhausted all peaceful channels52. The room for maneuvering left to the
Secretary-General in this circumstances was purely formal. As noted when
discussing Article 98 of the Charter, some mandates are only political façades
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Security Council Official Records, 2937th meeting, 18th August 1990.
Cited in PACE, E., U.N. Leader to Meet With Iraqi Minister in The New York Times,
August 27th 1990.
50
Idem.
51
The Security Council “Reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his
offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and to undertake diplomatic efforts in
order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of
Kuwait, on the basis of resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), and calls upon all
States, both those in the region and others, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in
conformity with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace, security and
stability”, adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen), Security Council
Official Records, 2951st meeting, 29th October 1990.
52
Cf. NEUMAN, E., op. cit., p. 102.
49
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used to either cover inaction by the deliberative bodies or, as in this case, to cover
an apparently set course of action.
A comparable pattern can be discerned in Kofi Annan’s good offices
initiative in Iraq in February 1998. In this case, however, the contours of the
legitimacy issue were different. Bluntly stated, the illusion of a rebirth of
collective security had, by this time, faded away. This may explain in part why the
Secretary-General was successful in at least postponing the crisis. The context
was alarmingly similar to the present tensions arising out of Iran’s nuclear
program. The Iraqi government was said to be developing weapons of mass
destruction. After UN inspectors were refused access to several presidential sites,
the US and the UK threatened to use force to ensure full access to these sites. As
in the early 1990s, the Secretary-General sought to dissociate himself from the
hostile stance adopted by the US and the UK in order to reach a face-saving
solution for Iraq. This time, however, the situation was somewhat different from
that during the Gulf crisis, for the behavior of the Iraqi government was not
blatantly inconsistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter53. There are of
course many variables affecting the concrete impact of the Secretary-General’s
action in a given case. Here, we focus only on the extent to which he was able to
gain some room for political maneuvering.
Beginning of February 1998, the Secretary-General expressed his regret as
to the insistence with which Saddam Hussein was being humiliated appealing:
“for that kind of wisdom that will allow us to make the kinds of judgments that
will allow us to get out of this”54. This was only possible because, as we have just
noted, the legitimacy issue presented in this case different contours. Indeed, one
could have hardly imagined Perez de Cuéllar expressing such a view during the
Gulf crisis. Mr Annan then sought at least some minimal support from the
permanent members of the Security Council for an eventual trip to Baghdad. The
American position at this point remained firm. If the Secretary-General was going
to attempt a good offices mission, he should keep in mind the American bottom
line, expressed in a number of written “talking points” intended to govern
Annan’s negotiations with Saddam Hussein. The reaction of the SecretaryGeneral provides an example of the form and extent to which he was able to say a
diplomatic ‘no’. In resisting to see his negotiations subject to governmental

53

This was, of course, a major line of controversy. From a legal perspective, the arguments
of Iraq had in this case more substance than its previous attempts at justifying the invasion of a
sovereign country.
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WREN, C.S., No Need to Humiliate Iraq, the Secretary-General Says in The New York
Times, February 11, 1998.
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instructions, the Secretary-General was upholding the underlying principles of his
Office while greatly contributing to his appearance of independence.
But such an attitude can only operate in narrowly defined limits. Indeed, the
US government was nevertheless able to suggest a number of guidelines, to some
extent agreed upon by the other permanent members of the Security Council, to be
“kept in mind” by the Secretary-General55. This modus operandi is interesting in
many respects. First, it suggests that unilateralism has discernable limits, since
what the US government could not fully impose by itself made later its way
through the endorsement of the other permanent members. Second, it also
illustrates the obvious point that the Secretary-General may receive “instructions”
regardless of any formal mandate under Article 98 of the Charter56. In this respect,
the case provides the conceptual contours of a second variant of the “Peking
formula” characterized by the fact that the Secretary-General seeks to dissociate
his authority not from a formal mandate of a deliberative body57 but from
informal instructions of the most powerful countries. Whether the arguable
illegality58 of such informal instructions leaves the Secretary-General more room
for maneuver than what a formal mandate would is not an easy question. From a
purely communicational perspective, however, the Secretary-General could more
easily dissociate his image from the instructions (while giving private assurances)
than in the case of a formal mandate from the Security Council. This may be a
subtle twist, but it did make a difference in the this particular case. This can also
be viewed as a very concrete way in which the legal powers of the SecretaryGeneral may push, albeit to a very limited extent, the boundaries of his political
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As noted by a senior American official: “What’s vital is that Mr. Annan understand where
our lines are … We want him to have no ambiguity about it. It’s not of concern to us if he gets the
Russians to think this is the right proposal, so long as the proposal is consistent with the relevant
Security Council resolutions, provides full access for Unscom and gives us some confidence this
won’t be endlessly repeated”, ERLANGER, S., U.S. Seeks to Limit the Role of U.N. Chief during
Iraq Talks in The New York Times, February 17, 1998.
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The unsuccessful experience of Javier Perez de Cuéllar, who had undertaken his
mediation effort in 1991 without the prior support of the Security Council, represented a clear
benchmark for the action of Kofi Annan, who wisely considered that such endorsement was an
indispensable condition for his mission to be successful: “If the trip is going to be successful, it has
to be carefully prepared, both here and in Baghdad”, See Idem.
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The Secretary-General received some formal support from the Security Council but only
in the form of a vague oral statement by its President: “The Security Council gives its full support
to the Secretary General’s mission because it would have real impact on the implementation of
United Nations resolutions”, cited in SCIOLINO, E., For U.N. Chief, Scarcely Room for
Negotiating in The New York Times, February 19, 1998.
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Article 1oo paragraph 2 of the UN Charter states indeed that: “Each Member of the
United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities
of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their
responsibilities”.

19

room for maneuver59. Whereas in 1955 the main source of pressure, namely the
General Assembly Resolution, was perfectly legal, which made in fact
Hammarskjold’s initiative legally dubious, in 1998, it was the source of pressure
that was legally dubious, not Kofi Annan’s initiative.
The Secretary-General eventually reached a peaceful solution, in the form of
a Memorandum of Understanding60. However, as we all know, this arrangement
did not last long, the situation leading to the use of force by an American-led
coalition in March 200361.

III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Legal Scope vs. Political Scope
The political role of the U.N. Secretary-General has been the object of a prolific
literature since the 1960s62. Curiously enough, although the “Peking formula” is
mentioned in many of these writings, no single study has been specifically
devoted to this modus operandi. In the present section we would like to spell out
what we consider as the main theoretical implication of this form of action,
namely the interactions between the legal and political scopes of action of the
59

There were other important elements suggesting that these boundaries were permeable,
including the rather moderate stances adopted by China, France and Russia as well as the passing
of Resolution 1153 (1998) renewing the “oil-for-food” program. See Security Council Official
Records, 3855th meeting, 20th February 1998. Paragraph 2 of this resolution allows Iraqi oil
pumping to attain a sum of US$ 5.256 billion, which is more than before. Annan was reported to
having said, reacting to the sarcasm showed during the negotiation by Taha Yassin Ramadan, the
Iraqi Vice-President: “I was so surprised and even frankly disappointed at the note which came
after approval of the $5.2 billion … After the discussions that we had gone through, I would have
expected at least a little thak-you for those people here who worked and helped make it happen”,
cf. TRAUB, J., Kofi Annan’s Biggest Headache in New York Times Magazine, April 5, 1998. The
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established by Resolution 986 (1995), Security Council Official Records, 3519th meeting, 14 April
1995.
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UN Doc. S/1998/166. On March 2, 1998, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
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from the Government of Iraq on compliance with its obligations under the relevant resolutions,
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For an analysis of the present situation see : FRANCK, T., What Happens Now? The
United Nations after Iraq in American Journal of International Law, 97/3, 2003, pp. 607-620.
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U.N. Secretary-General. Although the distinction between these two spheres is
implicit in the works of many prominent scholars63, it has yet to be spelled out64.
Concerning what we mean by legal scope of action of the SecretaryGeneral, practically speaking, a first approximation to this concept was given in
section one of this study, where we discussed the main provisions of the U.N.
Charter dealing with the Secretariat as well as the contours they took over the
years. From a purely legal perspective, such a characterization would suffice to
give a broad idea of what the Secretary-General can and cannot do. However, if
we stay at this level, at least two major questions remain unanswered. First, how
have these provisions come to legally justify certain initiatives by the SecretaryGeneral and not others? Second, can this expansion of the Secretary-General’s
legal powers provide him/her with the necessary political leverage to uphold, at
least to some extent, his/her independence when facing adverse stances by major
powers?
Let us deal with the second question first. Our discussion is based on the
quite obvious assumption that the provisions of the U.N. Charter are the result of a
given political configuration present when the Charter was adopted. This does not
necessarily mean that the underlying political compromise leading to the wording
of a given provision reflects a common view on a particular point. The wording of
a provision can indeed represent an “agreement to disagree”, as would be the case
of an extremely vague mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General in a situation
where there is no political consensus among the major powers to follow a defined
63

See for instance the already cited work of Franck and Nolte, where the authors note:
“Aside from these explicit or implicit authorizations, the Secretary-General, in order to perform
his good offices functions, must retain the confidence of the principal organs and the major
countries and regional groupings which constitute the organization. Thus the Secretary-General is
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limites politiques”, VIRALLY, M., Le role politique du Secrétaire général des Nations-Unies … ,
p. 372 (italics added).
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VINUALES, J.E., The U.N. Secretary-General between Law and Politics, cited supra footnote 28.
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course of action65. Conversely, if the meaning of legal rules is to a considerable
extent open, this should not lead us to conclude that the wording is utterly
irrelevant. Consenting to a particular meaning has at least two main effects. First,
it narrows down the scope of activities that can be claimed to be legal introducing
a distinction between “fair” interpretations and “overstretched” ones. Second, this
latter distinction is relevant with respect to the political legitimacy that can be
derived from a particular wording. Indeed, while overstretched interpretations
may still be advanced, they may not have the same legitimising effect than “fair”
or “settled” interpretations, as one could argue from our preceding discussion of
the case of Iraq. However, one cannot simply assume that legal provisions derive
their legitimacy once and for all from the political configuration underlying their
adoption. Such a simplification would be all the more inaccurate that the U.N.
Charter can be seen as a constitutional instrument. This point leads us to the
question of how the meaning of a given wording fluctuates over time.
Here, it must be noted is that a provision has no clear meaning unless it is
linked to a particular situation that would fall under this provision, either
hypothetical or concrete. Indeed, when there is no practice regarding a legal
provision, the understanding of the wording is derived from what the Drafters
anticipated. Thus, if we read the 1946 commentary of the UN Charter written by
Goodrich and Hambro66, the meaning of Chapter XV provisions draws almost
exclusively on the travaux préparatoires. Beyond what international law says
about interpretation, the very hermeneutical operation at play would seem to
require implementation as a condition for the existence of a particular meaning.
Somewhat like a Beethoven Sonata, it has no existence if it is not played, either in
a piano or in the head of its composer67. The legal scope is therefore given not
65

A good illustration is given by the mandate entrusted to Hammarskjold at the beginning
of the Congo crisis in 1960. As noted by Brian Urquhart, who serve under Hammarskjold’s
leadership during the crisis: “The terms of the original Security Council resolution on the Congo
were clear in one respect only, namely that the Secretary-General had the responsibility for doing
something about the Congo crisis. Precisely what, the resolution did not and could not say … In
this expedient vagueness, which had for the time being papered over the real differences among
the members of the Council, lay the seeds of many future problems. Moreover, in directing the
Secretary-General to eliminate any justification for foreign intervention by restoring law and
order, as far as possible with the help of the Congo government but without using force or
interfering in internal affairs, the Council from the start injected an inherent contradiction into the
Congo operation”, URQUHART, B., op. cit., pp. 403-404 (italics added).
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GOODRICH, L., HAMBRO, E., Commentaire de la Charte des Nations Unies, Editions de
la Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1946, in particular commentaries ad Articles 98 and 99.
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“In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is an essential tension between the fixed
text – the law or the gospel – on the one hand and, on the other, the sense arrived at by applying it
at the concrete moment of interpretation, either in judgement or in preaching. A law does not exist
in order to be understood historically, but to be concretised in its legal validity by being
interpreted. Similarly, the gospel does not exist in order to be understood as a merely historical
document, but to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving effect. This implies that the
text, whether law or gospel, if it is to be understood properly – i.e. according to the claim it makes
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only by the formal wording of a provision (the state of the law) but also by the
main real or hypothetical cases that are identified as falling under this wording, as
giving meaning to this wording (the state of the meaning). Of the whole set of
cases that could be argued to fall under a particular wording, some will be more
easily subsumed than others, and some will simply be excluded. At this point the
question arises of how this process of selection unfolds in the practice of the U.N.
Secretary-General? Although this question may seem utterly theoretical, it all
comes down to a very practical matter. To what extent can the U.N. SecretaryGeneral claim that he/she is acting according to the U.N. Charter to justify an
action in a given case?
This question must be addressed at three main levels. First, the initial gatekeeper of the state of the meaning of a particular wording is the legal system
itself. International law has sophisticated methods of interpretation now stated in
Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
reflects international customary law. Any interpretation disrespectful of these
methods is thus unable to ensure the “legality” of the meaning derived. But who
will ultimately decide whether a particular case has been subsumed following a
correct application of these interpretation methods? No lawyer would in good
faith deny that interpretation is not an exact procedure. This leads us to the second
level mentioned above. International law does not only supply a methodology for
its own interpretation but in some cases it also identifies an entity that will have
the final word in determining the meaning of a particular provision. In the U.N.
context, there is however no instance competent to issue authoritative
interpretations, so the U.N. Secretary-General could not claim, for instance, that
his/her interpretation of the relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter is the
definitive one. And even if he/she could, as would be the case of the International
Court of Justice in a dispute submitted to it according to Article 36 of the Court’s
Statute, such a claim would still depend to a large extent upon the overall
perception of this interpretation. At this third level, the state of the meaning is
viewed as an inter-subjective construction of the main actors involved. It is the
political configuration prevailing at the time, which will largely determine
whether a given action of the Secretary-General falls under his/her legal scope of
action. At this point one may ask whether we are not conducting a circular
reasoning. Such a conclusion would disregard the very idea of precedent.
Two types of precedents can be identified, The first type would cover those
cases that can be easily subsumed under a particular wording. They are precedents
only in that they give a fuller meaning to the wording, without necessarily pushing
its boundaries. The second type refers to borderline cases, i.e. those cases that are
not easily subsumed. A given political configuration may provide the political
– must be understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way.
Understanding here is always application”, GADAMER, H.-G., Truth and Method, 2nd edn.,
Continuum, New York, 2002 [1960], pp. 308-309.
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support for such a borderline case to be considered as a legitimate exercise of a
given power. Political convenience can thus lead to enlarge the state of the
meaning and thus also the legal scope. But precedents are sticky. Once this
enlargement has been produced it may be difficult, in similar circumstances, to
contend that such course of action is not authorized by the same legal provision.
Thus, when the political circumstances encourage the Secretary-General to take a
gamble, as was the case of Hammarskjold during the Sino-American crisis, and
this gamble is successful, then this may translate into an expansion of his legal
scope of action.
This latter point also suggests a first characterization of what can be called
the political scope of action. Political gambles are by definition legally dubious
until they are accepted and therefore retrospectively legitimised, which is not
always so. Politics have thus both an initial and an ongoing impact on the legal
scope of action of the Secretary-General. In some cases, as illustrated by Kofi
Annan’s initiative in the case of Iraq, the initial political configuration that led to
the development of a well-established good offices role for the Secretary-General,
counterbalanced to some extent the adverse impact of the ongoing political
configuration. Of course, it is all a matter of how far can the Secretary-General go
in saying ‘no’ in a particular circumstance. As Voltaire suggested, such a ‘no’ will
never look like a ‘no’ if the incumbent has enough diplomatic skill. But there may
be situations, such as the one faced by Perez de Cuéllar during the Gulf crisis, in
which no space is left even for the most diplomatic ‘no’. The interactions between
the legal and political scopes of action of the Secretary-General are thus
ambiguous. The more the Secretary-General bases his/her action on a
controversial interpretation of the relevant provisions, the less it will deploy its
legitimising effect. But the legitimacy the Secretary-General lacks when acting
ultra vires may be compensated, in the particular case, by ad hoc political support,
which in turn may permanently enlarge his legal scope of action. Conversely, the
political configuration at a given moment may not allow the Secretary-General to
exercise a well-established legal power, or at least not to use it fully. This latter
hypothesis is very frequent in the field of good offices.

B. Good Offices as an Expansion of the Secretary-General’s Legal Scope
The preceding analysis of the mechanisms underlying the “Peking Formula”
provides a broad conceptualisation of the complex interactions between the legal
and political considerations shaping the action of the Secretary-General. As far as
good offices are concerned, the trend has clearly been towards the enlargement of
the Secretary-General’s legal powers. A clear acknowledgement of this role as
part of the Secretary-General’s legal powers appears in General Assembly
Resolution 43/51 (1988) of 5 December 1988. This Declaration on the Prevention
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and Removal of Disputes and Situations which may Threaten International Peace
and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field states in its
relevant paragraphs: “20. The Secretary-General, if approached by a State or
States directly concerned with a dispute or situation, should respond swiftly by
urging the States to seek a solution or adjustment by peaceful means of their own
choice under the Charter and by offering his good offices or other means at his
disposal, as he deems appropriate; 21. The Secretary-General should consider
approaching the States directly concerned with a dispute or situation in an effort
to prevent it from becoming a threat to the maintenance of international peace
and security”68. Although nothing in the preceding wording deals specifically
with the powers of the Secretary-General when he has been entrusted a mandate
by a deliberative body according to Article 98 of the Charter, the wording
nonetheless acknowledges that the Secretary-General may intervene “as he deems
appropriate”. Moreover, paragraph 21 could be approached as a general good
offices mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General. In other words, although the
resolution does not expressly recognize the “Peking formula” modus operandi,
such technique can be easily subsumed under the wording of paragraphs 20 and
21.
In the aftermath of the Cold War it has become increasingly natural to see
the Secretary-General offer his good offices proprio motu. The legal enlargement
that has resulted from this practice is, however, not as obvious as it may now
seem. This point can be better appraised by recalling, for instance, how unnatural
such an enlargement appeared to be to the eyes of the USSR during the Bahrain
crisis. In a letter of 3 April 197069, the Soviet Permanent Representative
emphasized, recalling two other letters dated 27 August 196670 and 19 March
196971, that initiatives such as the one undertaken by U Thant went against the
provisions of the Charter, according to which all matters connected with the
maintenance of international peace and security had to be decided by the Security
Council. U Thant’s reply to this criticism anticipates the wording of the
aforementioned 1988 resolution showing the extent to which the now apparently
obvious conception of the UN Secretary-General’s political role was far from
being so at the time. U Thant noted indeed that from time to time States required
the Secretary-General to provide his good offices considering that an amicable
68

General Assembly Official Records, 68th plenary meeting, 5th December 1988. On this
resolution see LAVALLE, R., The ‘Inherent’ Powers of the UN Secretary-General in the Political
Sphere: A Legal Analysis in Netherlands International Law Review, 37/1, 1990, pp. 22-36. More
recently, the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change convened by the
Secretary-General also drew attention to: “ … the enormous increase in the workload of the
Secretary-General in the area of peace and security in the 1990s”, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, December 2 2004 (A/59/565), par. 293.
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UN Doc. S/9737, April 3rd 1970.
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United Nations Yearbook, 1966, p. 163.
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United Nations Yearbook, 1969, p. 146.
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solution can thus be reached, and that, in these circumstances, the SecretaryGeneral felt: “obligated to assist Member States in the manner requested, for to do
otherwise would be to thwart a commendable effort by Member States to abide by
a cardinal principle of the Organization, namely, the peaceful settlement of
disputes”72. This opposition was eventually overcome, mainly on the basis of ad
hoc political support.
Such support is, however, not sufficient in itself to operate a permanent
extension of the Secretary-General’s legal scope of action, as one could conclude
from the different fate undergone by the attempts at vesting military powers in the
Secretary-General. The paroxysm of such attempts can be found in the wording of
Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 199273, and especially in
paragraphs 6, 7 and 10, where the Council: “Decides that the operations and the
further deployment of the 3’500 personnel of the United Nations Operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM) … should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General
in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground”, then adding that it:
“Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General … that action under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as
soon as possible” and authorizing: “Acting under Chapter VII … the SecretaryGeneral and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred in
paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”. This
resolution is especially significant if we take into account that even the United
States appeared to put peace-enforcement decisions in the Secretary-General’s
hands74.
Moreover, such ad hoc support may be extremely ambiguous. The case of
Somalia is also useful to illustrate this point. There was a substantial
misunderstanding between the ambitious aims of the UN Secretary-General and
the extent to which the US administration was ready to maintain its political
endorsement. President Bush’s original approach, manifested by the action of US
envoy Robert Oakley, was that the US backing of UNOSOM would be limited
and serve specifically to allow the delivering of humanitarian relief, within a
framework of realistic dialogue open to all factions. In contrast to this view,
Boutros Ghali’s approach was increasingly perceived as partial as well as far too
ambitious for a country where the US had no special interest. Later, despite the
Clinton administration initial support of Boutros Ghali’s far-reaching “nation72

Letter of 6 April 1970 from the Secretary-General, transmitting to the Security Council the
reply dated 4 April 1970 to Permanent Mission of USSR, UN Doc S/9738, cited in United Nations
Yearbook, 1970, p. 285.
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Security Council Official Records, 3145th meeting. Italics are added.
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Newman points out that Acting US Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, stressed that:
“the United States would not proceed if the Secretary-General opposed the plan”, NEWMAN, E.,
op. cit., p. 137.
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building” project75, through the endorsement of Security Council Resolutions
81476, 83777 and 86578, the American casualties in October 1993 brought about a
radical policy change with the regard to the US involvement in the conflict.
Boutros Ghali suddenly appeared as having gone too far. Leaving aside the
defiant way in which Boutros Ghali reacted to subsequent American criticism79,
what matters above all is that while Boutros Ghali’s initiatives might have
constituted, initially, an enlargement of the Secretary-General’s role in peace and
security matters, as the political space gained by US endorsement was legally
dressed up through a number of audacious Security Council resolutions,
subsequent practice has showed that such legal clothe is no longer fashionable80.
75

Newman cites the US Ambassador before the UN, Madeleine Albright, saying that the
objective was: “nothing less than the restoration of an entire country”, Ibid., p. 139.
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In particular paragraphs B.5 and B.14, where “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter” the
council: “5. Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its mandate in accordance with
the recommendations contained in paragraphs 56-88 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3
March 1993 …” and “14. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to
direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation,
expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, taking account of the
particular circumstances in each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with the
recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993 …”, Security Council Official Records,
3188th meeting, 26 March 1993 (italics added).
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141.
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The “post-Somalia syndrome”, to quote the then Under Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, had a strong impact in subsequent crises such as those in Angola,
Burundi and Rwanda. For instance, as Christopher Pycroft observes, qualifying Angola of
“Forgotten Tragedy”: “The end of the Cold War, and the reduction in South Africa’s destabilising
influence in Angola, increased optimism that a peaceful transition could be achieved in a country
that had endured over 30 years of conflict, and has had no experience of democracy. This
optimism was increased by the success of the independence process in Namibia, and by the
transition to democracy in South Africa. In the event, this optimism was misplaced, and the
international community, particularly the UN, was guilty of, in the words of US Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moore, trying to get an agreement on the cheap
where the preoccupation with the cost of a UN operation outweighed a whole range of other
considerations” then adding that “UN policy towards Angola has been influenced more by the
experience in Somalia, where the UN forces suffered losses and alienated considerable sections of
the community while attempting to ensure humanitarian aid. The UN reluctance to become
similarly embroiled may have been the guiding principle in determining policy towards Angola”,
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The different legal fates of, on the one hand, the Secretary-General’s good offices
role, and, on the other hand, his military powers, offer a concrete illustration of
how the broad categories outlined before could help analyze the past evolution of
the office and perhaps also the ways in which it could be developed in the future.
It is, of course, not easy to explain why the good offices practice has followed
what could be called a “cumulative” or “constructive” pattern whereas the
involvement of the Secretary-General in military determinations has instead been
characterized by a “boom-bust” pattern.
A first possible explanation of such different fates can be sought in the
actual characteristics of the two practices. The good offices practice may, in this
respect, be less dependent upon the particular personality traits of the incumbent
than the exercise of military powers, or, viewed from a different angle, the
personalities selected to become Secretary-General may all have at least modicum
of experience and skill in handling international negotiations, a minimum that
may be, of course, higher in some cases but never too low. Good offices may also
benefit from a more constant “demand” on the part of States. A second possible
explanation, related to the first, would look at the very features of legal reception
methods. Constant and regular practices such as good offices may be easier to
translate into legal terms than actions characterized by their exceptionality. After
all, precedents need confirmation to become new standards. These are but
suggestions as to what a strategy to enlarge the Secretary-General’s legal scope of
political action could be concerned with.
In any case, it is safe to say that the Peking formula has indeed made it
into the legal realm governing the Secretary-General’s action. As we have tried to
show, this does not necessarily mean that the Secretary-General will always, or
even often, be able to say ‘no’. Recalling the metaphor used by Javier Perez de
Cuéllar as to the Scylla and Charybdis, the dangerous streams, the SecretaryGeneral must always keep in mind, let us conclude by saying that, whatever the
strength or the direction of such streams, any future incumbent will have to know
or learn how to navigate through very stormy conditions. In doing so, he or she
may find Hammarskjold’s navigating formula a pragmatic and time-proven
technique to reach the desired harbours.

PYCROFT, C., Angola, The Forgotten Tragedy in Journal of Southern African Studies, 2/20, June
1994, pp. 260-261. In a similar vein see PEREIRA, A., The Neglected Tragedy: The Return to
War in Angola, 1992-3 in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1/32, March 1994, pp. 1-28.
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